



2006 Electronic Balloting Advisory Committee Recommendations

The Electronic Balloting Advisory Committee met three times during the interim to discuss issues surrounding the use of electronic voting machines. The committee was formed to consider the adoption of a pilot program to test the use of a verified voter-paper trail with electronic voting machines. The discussions of such a system led to other discussions concerning the security of voting generally, regardless of the type of technology used. Particular attention was paid to elections taking place around the country on November 8, 2006, when nearly one-third of the country used new voting systems (including the use of verified voter paper trails).

Recommendations:

- I. **No recommendation:** The Electronic Balloting Advisory Committee did not make a recommendation to JCOTS to pursue legislation that would create a pilot program in upcoming elections to use a voter-verified paper trail. Concerns were raised as to how such a pilot would operate, how the jurisdictions incorporated by the pilot would be chosen, and how votes would be tallied in light of a malfunction in a pilot jurisdiction.

- II. **Bill; Security Recommendations:** The Electronic Balloting Advisory Committee makes several recommendations to JCOTS to ensure the security of electronic voting machines, regardless of the type of machine or technology utilized. The Committee recommends a bill that would require localities to develop security plans, and ensure that such plans are annually updated. The bill would also include language that would require the State Board of Elections to assist localities in the development of these plans, upon request. Vendors whose voting machines are certified in Virginia would be required to submit their security "best practices" for the particular machine, and would be required to update this document annually for continued certification. Finally, the bill would require a third-party trusted agent in the Commonwealth to review all electronic ballots and software received by a vendor before they are installed on a voting machine in a locality. This final element is similar to a system used in Georgia.